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Abstract 
Effective learning is essential for a safe workplace. Through learning from incidents (LFI), 
knowledge is applied and embedded within the work environment in ways that can prevent future 
incidents. In order to improve their LFI processes, such as incident reporting and analysis, or the 
dissemination of investigation outputs, organisations need an instrument that allows them to 
diagnose the quality and effectiveness of their LFI processes, making sure that LFI leads to positive 
safety outcomes. This paper outlines an instrument that measures the quality of LFI processes and 
practices: the Learning from Incident Questionnaire (LFIQ). The LFIQ identifies employees’ 
perceptions and experiences of LFI processes and practices. This paper describes the validation of 
the LFIQ instrument via a pilot study conducted at two energy companies involving 781 participants. 
Through factor analysis the instrument was shown to have sufficient validity to become a useful tool 
for industry; by gaining insight into employees’ perspectives on LFI, frontline managers and 
supervisors can have evidence on which to base improvements to the local work environment and 
prioritise areas for improvement.  
1. Introduction 
Effective learning from incidents (LFI) is critical for safe working. It allows knowledge to be applied 
and embedded in work environments in ways that can prevent future incidents (Cooke & Rohleder, 
2006). However, learning processes often are not implemented effectively, since the design of LFI 
initiatives is seldom based on empirical evidence from research on Workplace and Organisational 
Learning (Lukic et al., 2010).  
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In many organisations, the activities designed to enable employees to learn from incidents are based 
around the dissemination of the findings from incident investigations (see for example Phimister et 
al., 2003; Lundberg et al., 2009). However, dissemination of incident information does not always 
result in learning and action to change professional practice in the ways that are needed to prevent 
future incidents. In order to learn, people have to move beyond receiving incident information to 
actively engaging with this information and, where necessary, changing practice (Lukic et al., 2010). 
To do this, employees have to apply and make sense of incident information in ways that are 
meaningful to their job role; they have to reflect on the information and actively connect it to their 
professional practice (Lukic et al., 2013).   
There are at least two main problems in moving individual employees towards actively engaging 
with incident information and, when necessary, changing practice (Lukic et al., 2013). First, many 
LFI activities focus on employees receiving and reading incident information, rather than engaging 
with incident knowledge. Second, during work there are few opportunities for employees to reflect 
and make sense of incident information in relation to their own job role. This problem is particularly 
acute with frontline employees. Front line managers and supervisors are not always able to engage 
front line employees with incident information in ways that maximise reflection and sense making.  
The research reported in this article is part of a larger study that aimed to address these problems. 
The need for a tool to measure LFI activity across each industrial site, and even across the sector, 
was heralded by the Energy Institute, a membership organization that wanted to measure employees’ 
perceptions and experiences of learning from incidents within and across organizations.  The study, 
Engaging with Learning From Incidents (LFI-Engage, http://www.gcu.ac.uk/academy/lflengage/), 
was funded by the Energy Institute to improve the effectiveness of LFI in organisations by 
supporting front line managers and supervisors in understanding the current status of LFI capability 
at their site, how this can be improved and how to more effectively engage with frontline employees 
on learning from incidents. The main output was a Toolkit designed to support front line managers 
and supervisors, especially with regards to encouraging sense-making and reflection within the LFI 
process. This paper reports the development and validation of a tool from the Toolkit, the LFI 
Questionnaire tool, which is designed to diagnose the quality of current LFI activities in an 
organisation with a view to understanding how these activities might impact on each individual’s 
learning.   
Research by Lähteenmäki et al. (2001) was the first to suggest that the initial step in improving LFI 
should be to examine existing LFI activities within each organisation.  Arguably, this process calls 
for a valid and reliable instrument, which is sensitive to specific features of organisational learning 
(Easterby-Smith, 1998; Gherardi & Nicolini, 2000). There are a number of methodological approaches 
that could be used to diagnose quality of LFI, including ethnographic (Buescher et al., 2009), 
‘sensemaking’ (Snowden, 2002), socio-cultural (Sanne, 2008) and cognitive-psychology based 
approaches (Stanton & Walker, 2011). The associated instruments are difficult for managers and 
supervisors to implement for various reasons – primarily because they are too specialised and 
technical to be used by non-researchers and are therefore out of scope for use by frontline staff.  
LFI must be considered across the whole organization, or site, to capture all facets of the LFI process 
across different levels (Lukic et al., 2012a).  The primary reason is because the cumulative effects of 
individual LFI activities across a site impact on the overall success - or failure - of LFI within an 
organisation.  However, no instrument to measure LFI across an organization is currently available.  
This paper proposes an instrument, the Learning from Incident Questionnaire (LFIQ), to measure the 
quality of LFI processes and practice across an organization or site.  
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2. Conceptual underpinnings 
 
A comprehensive review of the literature was conducted to investigate existing models to provide a 
theoretical and conceptual platform for the questionnaire.  Chiva et al. (2006) summarise that 
diagnostic instruments measuring the effectiveness of organisational learning tend to focus on two 
conceptual areas: (1) learning activities and their sequence, and (2) specific factors facilitating 
effective learning. With regards to the former, instruments addressing learning activities and their 
sequencing typically measure discreet phases of the learning process, for example the work of 
Drupsteen, Groeneweg, and Zwetsloot (2013) who conceptualised LFI as a series of steps to 
understand loss of learning potential in the process.  In contrast, facilitating learning is based on 
measuring well-established properties or components (i.e. factors) which aid in effective learning.  
These two features - the activities and the factors inherent to effective learning - are interrelated as 
the what and how of learning.  That is, the activities required to achieve effective learning outcomes 
are triggered by the factors associated with effective learning. Both these notions have been 
incorporated into instruments designed to measure safety climates, such as the Nordic Safety Climate 
Questionnaire, where learning activities (the what) are a subscale of safety climate (Kines et al., 
2011); specific factors that enable learning (the how) have also been considered subscales of safety 
climate instruments, for example, individual motivation (Nielsen, Hystad, & Eid, 2016) and 
commitment to the workplace (Nielsen, Rasmussen, Glasscock, & Spangenberg, 2008).There are 
also tools aimed specifically at measuring the quality of organisational learning that cover both 
conceptual features, such as the instrument for Organisational Climate for Learning from Errors at 
Work (OLE) (Putz et al., 2013) or the model proposed by Edmondson (1999) relating team 
psychological safety, learning behaviours and performance. However, these tools tend to focus on a 
single organisational factor (e.g., learning climate) rather than the quality of the overall LFI 
processes. The conceptual baseline for the LFIQ were two models, developed through earlier 
empirical research: the LFI Framework (Lukic et al., 2012a) and the LFI Process Model (Lukic et al., 
2012b). The reason these models were selected is because they were the first within the literature in 
this field to explore learning activities across the various phases of LFI (Lukic et al., 2010).  
 
2.1. The LFI Process Model  
The LFI Process Model (Figure 1) is used to map LFI activities across a site to phases of the LFI 
lifecycle (Lukic et al., 2012b). The LFI Process Model was developed through analysis of LFI 
activity on different industrial sites. There are normally six phases of LFI:  reporting incidents, 
investigating incidents, developing incident alerts, disseminating information, contextualising 
information and implementing actions.  
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Figure 1. The LFI Process model 
The LFI Process Model describes these phases as sequential.  That is, (1) reporting an incident 
(including a near miss) is essential in raising awareness and allowing for preventive actions to be 
formulated.  This leads to an (2) investigation of the incident(s) to determine both the immediate and 
underlying causes of the incident.  Based on this investigation, recommendations for improving 
safety or changing practice are developed and shared across the relevant site in the form of an (3) 
incident alert.  Incident alerts are tools to help employees understand how to prevent similar 
incidents from reoccurring.  (4) Dissemination should be targeted towards relevant rather than all 
groups of workers, i.e., those employees who will benefit from each particular incident alert.  The (5) 
contextualisation phase is important in learning as incident information has to be critically assessed 
and reflected upon within each employee’s relevant workplace context.  The final phase requires the 
(6) implementation of actions and changes by all relevant employees, thereby using the information 
with the aim of preventing similar incidents in the future. 
This process forms a foundation to understand the effectiveness and inter-relationship of existing LFI 
activities on sites.     
 
2.2. The LFI Framework  
Before 2012, Learning from Incidents was not underpinned by theories of organisational or adult 
learning (Lukic et al., 2012a). The LFI Framework (Figure 1) represents an early attempt to underpin 
LFI activity with these theories (ibid), taking into consideration critical components that influence 
organizational learning, such as how lessons are learned, the severity of the consequences of an 
incident and the people involved as well as team learning components, such as trust 
(Edmondson,1999). The Framework was selected as a baseline for the LFIQ because it integrates 
concepts from diverse yet related learning theories that: a) serve as analytical lenses to understand 
facets of LFI and b) provide prescriptive values when developing interventions in LFI. The 
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framework is based on five key learning components identified through the literature as being 
important for effective LFI (for a detailed description of each component see Lukic et al., 2012a):  
1. Learning context – learning might be organised and structured (e.g., courses or training) or 
could be informal (e.g., on-the-job learning). Informal learning is more difficult to perceive 
as ‘learning’ per se; 
2. Learning participants – people in diverse roles or different areas of the organisation may 
prefer distinctive ways of learning;   
3. Learning process – there are different reasons for learning that may require different 
processes. The learning process has to align with specific learning goals; 
4. Type of incident – a large-scale and complex incident will require a different learning 
solution compared to a small-scale incident; 
5. Type of knowledge – different sorts of activities are required to learn different types of 
knowledge. For example, theoretical and practical knowledge are learned in different ways. 
 
Figure 2. The LFI Framework (Lukic et al., 2012a) 
 
These two perspectives, the temporal and sequential learning phases of the LFI Process Model and 
the underpinning learning components of the LFI Framework, function together in an effective LFI 
process.  
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3. Design of LFIQ 
In line with the LFI Process Model and Framework used to inform the LFIQ, we developed two sets 
of related scales: the learning component scale (e.g., formality of learning) and the learning phase 
scale (e.g., reporting). Each learning component was broken down into specific dimensions, which 
were then coded with the relevant learning phases. The link between learning component dimensions 
and the related learning phases was achieved through formulating a latent question that would lead to 
the development of a specific statement. In other words, each phase of the LFI process contained 
multiple statements that would be rated to assess a learning component crucial during that phase. 
Appendix A details the operationalization of each of the five learning components, illustrating the 
latent questions and relevant learning phases from the LFI Process Model.  For each learning 
component three or four latent questions were created, designed to capture the essence of a 
dimension of that particular learning component. For each latent question one to three learning 
phases was identified. A statement item was then developed for each of phase identified in a 
dimension of a component. Each statement was therefore associated with both a learning component 
and a learning phase. 
The questionnaire consisted of two parts.  Part 1 related to the background of respondents (9 
questions) while part 2 the statements outlined above which respondents rated using a 5 point Likert 
scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree.  Each question focuses on one 
learning component within a single phase of LFI.  
There were five learning component scales: 
1. Type of problem (6 items) 
2. Learning participants (11 items) 
3. Learning processes (8 items) 
4. Type of knowledge (4 items), and 
5. Formality of learning (5 items). 
Matching these, six learning phase scales were developed: 
1. Reporting (5 items) 
2. Investigating (3 items) 
3. Developing incident alerts (9 items) 
4. Disseminating (8 items) 
5. Contextualising (14 items), and 
6. Implementing actions (6 items). 
The ‘developing incident alert’ items were sensitive to respondents in that only those who indicated 
in Part 1 that they were involved in this particular process were asked to complete these items.  This 
meant that the total questionnaire items ranged between 36 and 45 items depending on the 
respondent’s designation.  Table 1 outlines a number of item examples demonstrating how these map 
onto the learning component and the learning phase scales. 
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Table 1. Examples of questionnaire items 
Item Learning component scale Learning phase scale 
Q23. Our company has a system in place 
that allows all employees to easily report 
incidents. 
Participants of learning Reporting 
Q35. We consider if the incident 
information we receive is relevant to our 
own work. 
Type of problem Contextualising 
Q44. The incident information we receive 
helps us understand which procedures we 
need to follow in order to prevent future 
incidents. 
Type of knowledge Contextualising 
 
4. Validation of LFIQ  
We tested the validity and applicability of the LFIQ across two sites in two different, multinational, 
energy companies. Site 1 was a large upgrader site within a multinational company in the oil and gas 
sector in Canada, with around 1500 employees. Site 2 was a wind power plant within a UK energy 
company, with around 60 employees.  We chose to include both sites in the utility testing to increase 
the applicability of the instrument to different companies. This noted, caution is advised as 
applicability does not necessarily infer generalisability. For example, the total sample size is limited, 
and therefore cannot be considered representative of diverse companies and sites.   
 
4.1. Content Validity 
Content validity was established through two mechanisms: expert interviews and a pilot study.  
4.1.1. Expert interviews 
To ensure that the instrument effectively captured the topic under investigation we interviewed 
‘experts’, in other words, those who have an in-depth understanding of the topic of the instrument 
(LFI) through focus groups. The experts were front line managers, safety managers and contractor 
representatives. When designing the questionnaire, we used principles of questionnaire design 
(Peterson, 2000; Oppenheim, 1996; Olsen, 2012). We also utilised feedback from six practitioners to 
sharpen the items prior to conducting the expert interviews in the form of focus groups. These focus 
groups were conducted on each of the two industrial sites. Sampling was facilitated by nominated 
gatekeepers who recruited a cross-section representing a stratified convenience sample.  The Site 1 
focus group comprised of 14 participants while the Site 2 focus group consisted of 7 interviewees. 
The focus groups were recorded, transcribed and coded using NVIVO.  Thematic analysis was 
carried out on the focus groups transcripts. The reason thematic analysis was selected as a 
methodology, rather than open coding, was because the themes had already been established through 
the earlier literature review (Lukic et al, 2012). Thematic analysis was used to gather feedback from 
experts to understand if the items of the questionnaire reflected important themes within each 
category.  This procedure was suggested by Nassar-McMillan and Borders (2002, p. 6) who noted 
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that although there are no clearly defined rules for the use of focus groups in measurement 
development, they aid in comparing groups’ reactions to the same concepts and providing richer data 
for developing valid instruments. The coding was performed by one researcher and cross-coded 
independently by two further researchers. The coding was cross-checked and refined where 
inconsistencies arose to improve the overall reliability. 
The emergent themes used for the analysis were defined by the earlier research on LFI phases and 
learning components.  Qualitative analysis was used to determine whether sufficient content related 
validity evidence existed. Test content refers to the themes, wording, and format of the items, tasks, 
or questions on a test. Content validity was critical and the thematic analysis explored whether the 
items held the same meaning for people within and between groups and whether the items 
adequately operationalized the concepts they were developed to assess. If items were not found to 
adequately operationalize a concept, then an attempt was made to determine whether this was due to 
unclear wording or insufficient shared conceptual understanding.  
We used thematic analysis to examine emergent themes within and between sites.  Interviewees were 
asked to explain each LFIQ question in their own words.  We also presented the outcomes of each 
question using the data gathered from their site and invited their views on the accuracy of the 
outcomes.  
Where appropriate, we revised items according to participants’ feedback. For example, interviewees 
provided alternative wording suggestions for a number of items thought to be unclear. A detailed 
account of the methodology and results of the focus groups have been published elsewhere (Lukic et 
al., 2013).  However, the validation of the LFIQ Tool within single-site testbeds in two organisations 
has not been published and is the focus of this paper. The pilot study is described below to provide a 
baseline for the instrument validation. 
 
4.1.2. Pilot study 
We conducted a pilot study in order to test the clarity of the LFIQ questions. The aim of the pilot 
study was to assess how well the wording of the LFIQ questions would be understood by the target 
user groups. We purposefully selected nine practitioners who worked in one of the two energy 
companies involved in the study. To enhance the representativeness of the sample we included 
people from various roles at different levels across the organisational hierarchy.  We aimed for a 
cross-section of practitioners, i.e. we chose individuals from diverse professional backgrounds, in 
order to provide diverse points of views and enhance representativeness across the organisation. All 
nine respondents received an online version of the LFIQ and were asked to comment on the clarity 
and structure of questions. Six practitioners completed the questionnaires, and two of these also 
agreed to a follow-up interview regarding the clarity of the questions.  Based on the feedback, 
selected questions were modified to improve the clarity of the questionnaire in the initial phases of 
the instrument development.  
 
4.2. Construct Validity 
To determine construct validity, we distributed the LFIQ across both sites through site-wide bulletins 
sent via email.  The bulletins invited employees to participate in the study, and provided a summary 
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of the study and a rationale for the LFIQ.  We informed all potential respondents that participation 
was voluntary.  The total number of responses from Site 1 was 740 (response rate of 50%) and 41 
from Site 2 (response rate of 67%). Table 2 indicates the number of respondents by role. While 
questionnaires dealing with perceptions can be susceptible to social desirability, i.e., respondents 
answering in ways they view as desirable rather than accurate, the effects of this were minimised in 
two ways: question design (questions related to organisational states rather than individual qualities), 
and by conducting the study as self-administered and anonymous (Nederhof, 1985). 
Table 2: Number of respondents by role 
Type of role Site 1 Site 2 
% N % N 
Senior manager 1.2 9 7.3 3 
Middle manager 4.5 33 14.6 6 
Immediate supervisor of front-line/shop-floor workers 14.5 107 26.8 11 
Front-line/Shop-floor worker 68.9 510 46.3 19 
Health, Safety, Security, Environment (HSSE) Professional 
8.0 59 0 0 
Administration 1.1 8 4.9 2 
Missing values 1.9 14 0 0 
Total  740  41 
 
Factor analysis  
A factor analysis was carried out to explore the underlying structure and statistical components of the 
LFIQ. An exploratory factor analysis is recommended when the underlying structure of the dataset is 
not known, and when there are no preconceived hypotheses regarding the number and nature of 
factors. A principle component analysis, in contrast, is of a more confirmatory nature. That is, this 
method seeks to confirm if the number of factors identified conform to the researchers’ expectations 
based on previous results.  An initial assessment of the data was carried out to determine the 
suitability of the data for factor analysis, i.e. whether the assumptions required for factor analysis have been 
met, and to determine sampling adequacy. 
Suitability and Sampling adequacy of data 
We initially assessed the suitability and sampling adequacy of the data via three methods: item-to-
respondent ratio, Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s test of sphericity. 
The number of respondents from Site 1 (N=740) was above the suggested 1:10 item-to-respondent 
ratio, making the scales suitable for factor analysis. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling 
adequacy of the Validation data ranged from .70 to .90 for all scales, which is above the minimum 
recommended value of .60. The Bartlett’s test of sphericity for all scales was significant with p<.001, 
meeting the minimum requirement of p < .05. These tests indicated that the data at Site 1 were 
suitable for principal component analysis. Due to the small size of the sample from Site 2 (N=41) 
factor analysis was not performed on the Site 2 dataset. Although the response rate from site 2 was 
relatively high (67%), the number of responses is not sufficient to ensure that factor analysis results 
are meaningful. 
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Principle Component Analysis 
Principal component analysis (PCA) was used both on a global and on a local scale for Site 1. The 
global analysis reveals the importance of one prominent factor that could measure the global quality 
of LFI at the site. The relatively low number of observations with respect to the number of variables 
may produce inaccuracies in the estimation of the global correlation structure, though locally, factor 
analysis was also used on each scale separately, as they offered clear factor structure. We used 
varimax rotation despite the majority of scales being mono-factorial.  This is in line with Gorsuch 
(1983) who recommends to use varimax rotation (for orthogonal rotation) if the ‘simple structure is 
clear’ in the data (p.205).  In cases where the analysis resulted in factors with less than 3 variables 
loading more than 0.5, PCA was repeated limiting the number of factors (Barbaranelli, 2006).  
 
Global PCA 
A global PCA was used to identify which of the LFI variables correlate into single components. This 
test was carried out using the available data on the ‘Developing incident alerts’ scale. We ran the 
analysis on the complete questionnaire (125 questions) and, respectively, on the sub-questionnaire 
obtained after the removal of the Developing incident alerts scale (653 complete questionnaires with 
36 questions).  
Shapiro-Wilk normality tests on each question indicated non-normality in the distribution of 
observations. This is confirmed by a negative skew in each answer and the fact that answer “4” 
exceeds 50% in 26 out of the 45 questions. The conclusion of both diagonalisations are similar: one 
direction summarises a major proportion of the variance (35.59% and 35.21%, respectively for each 
diagonal). The remainder of the eigendirections accounts separately for very little (a maximum of 
6.5%, decreasing rapidly). The loadings for the one-factor factor analysis (in the first analysis) are 
illustrated below in Table 3. 
Table 3: Loadings for the one-factor factor analysis 
LFIQ question One 
Factor 
Loading 
Q56 Our company listens to employees’ ideas and suggestions for improving safety. 0.785 
Q54 Employees are informed about the outcomes of implementation of incident 
prevention recommendations/actions. 
0.767 
Q39 The employees at this site can offer their recommendations for preventing future 
incidents. 
0.749 
Q52 At our work-site, we learn from near misses and incidents. 0.740 
Q46 The incident information we receive helps us understand which procedures we 
need to follow in order to prevent future incidents. 
0.734 
Q45 We receive information about incidents that allows us to understand what really 
happened and how we can learn from it. 
0.709 
Q48 Incident information we receive suggests useful safety attitudes and values that can 
help us prevent future incidents. 
0.707 
Q51 We make a clear plan of action at the end of safety meetings. 0.695 
Q50 At this work-site, we consider if we need to change the way we conduct work 0.678 
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based on the incident information we receive. 
Q23 Incident investigations are conducted in such a way that allows employees to be 
honest. 
0.677 
Q24 We identify all the root causes of an incident before implementing further 
improvements. 
0.673 
Q53 We discuss whether safety recommendations from previous incidents are 
appropriate for our work before implementing them at our work-site. 
0.671 
Q44 We always receive responses to feedback we give on incident information. 0.670 
Q31 Employees at this site make sure that important information about incidents is 
shared with other employees who might benefit from it. 
0.670 
Q38 At our work-site, we receive all the relevant incident information discussed at 
safety meetings. 
0.668 
Q33 At this work-site, we discuss incidents and what to do to prevent them with our 
colleagues outside safety meetings and safety-specific communications. 
0.668 
Q40 At our work-site, we often give feedback to the authors of incident information. 0.663 
Q49 There is a system in place for informal contribution of ideas and suggestions 
regarding safety and past incidents. 
0.655 
Q15 When preparing incident information/lessons learned, we tell employees where to 
find more information about the incident. 
0.640 
Q32 Information about incidents reaches all employees, even if they were away (off 
shift or on leave) when the incident information was disseminated. 
0.639 
Q28 Employees are routinely informed about the progress and outcomes of incident 
investigations. 
0.637 
Q22 Our company has a system in place that allows all employees to easily report 
incidents. 
0.634 
Q42 We recognise when a piece of information about safety from our private 
discussions is important for the rest of the organisation. 
0.632 
Q43 We inform the safety department about good ideas related to safety that arise from 
our informal discussions. 
0.620 
Q25 Incident investigations are conducted by a professional team who understand the 
nature of incidents. 
0.620 
Q18 At our site we report both incidents and near misses. 0.606 
Q47 We know where to find relevant information regarding incidents so that we can 
prevent future similar incidents. 
0.602 
Q36 We actively discuss incident information with our colleagues. 0.599 
Q16 When we disseminate incident information/lessons learned, we outline the 
attitudes and values that could help prevent another incident. 
0.585 
Q27 At our work-site, we receive incident information that is relevant to our work. 0.583 
Q29 Employees who do not regularly use computers at our work-site receive the same 
information about incidents as other employees. 
0.582 
Q41 We can comment on incident information we receive if we disagree with it. 0.577 
Q20 The management at our site consistently encourages reporting of incidents. 0.560 
Q13 When preparing incident information/lessons learned, we clearly point out why an 
incident has occurred. 
0.547 
Q17 We can report incidents without fear of repercussions. 0.520 
Q14 When developing incident information/lessons learned, we clearly point out which 
procedures need to be followed to avoid future incidents. 
0.490 
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Q26 At our work-site, we modify the way we learn from incidents depending on the 
nature of the incident. 
0.472 
Q11 Clear recommendations and actions are suggested in the incident 
information/lessons learned we disseminate across the site after an incident. 
0.471 
Q30 All employees eventually get to hear about incident information that other 
colleagues discussed informally. 
0.438 
Q37 We continually question incident information we receive. 0.438 
Q9 When developing incident information/lessons learned, we adapt the content to 
suit different employees who will be receiving them. 
0.415 
Q35 We consider if the incident information we receive is relevant to our own work. 0.414 
Q10 We apply different learning approaches when learning form complex incidents 
compared with the approaches we use for simple incidents. 
0.375 
Q12 When preparing incident information/lessons learned, we decide whether the 
incident is relevant to the whole site or to specific work groups. 
0.343 
Q21 Incidents at our site do not get reported due to fear of negative consequences. 0.332 
Q19 At our workplace incidents are sometimes reported informally to colleagues 
without a formal record of the report. 
0.217 
Q55 We follow the recommendations/actions in incident information without 
discussing them first. 
0.185 
Q34 We hear about incidents through informal discussions with our colleagues rather 
than through formal safety information systems. 
0.152 
 
There is a slight increase in the loadings for the latter questions, which indicates that this direction 
intuitively measures the global quality of LFI at the site and the last phase plays a prominent role in 
the questionnaire. However, no single component plays a specific role in determining the global 
quality of the Learning from Incidents Questionnaire.  
 
Local PCA  
1. Learning Phase scales 
A local factor analysis was conducted using only the data from Site 1. Four learning phase scales 
were identified as mono-factorial (Reporting, Investigation and Disseminating and Implementing 
actions) and two as bi-factorial (Developing incident alerts and Dissemination). Table 4 describes the 
factor loadings for the four mono-factorial scales and illustrates how each item performs within each 
scale/component. The factor loadings for three questions (Q19, Q34 and Q55) were below the 
acceptable level of 0.5. The PCA results for the mono-factorial LFI scales indicated that the learning 
phase scales can be viewed as bounded constructs.  
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Table 4. Factor analysis of the mono-factorial learning phase scales 
Scale Items Factor loading 
 Q17 At our workplace incidents are sometimes reported 
informally to colleagues without a formal record of the 
report.  
0.77 
Q18  At our site, we report both incidents and near misses. 0.77 
Q21 Incidents at our site do not get reported due to fear of 
negative consequences. 
0.71 
Q22 Our company has a system in place that allows all 
employees to easily report incidents. 
0.65 
Q20 The management at our site consistently encourages 
reporting of incidents. 
0.63 
Q19 At our workplace incidents are sometimes reported 
informally to colleagues without a formal record of the 
report. 
 0.37* 
Investigating Q24 We identify all the root causes of an incident before 
implementing further improvements. 
0.85 
Q23 Incident investigations are conducted in such a way 
that allows employees to be honest. 
0.84 
Q25 Incident investigations are conducted by a professional 
team who understand the nature of incidents. 
0.84 
Disseminating Q31 Employees at this site make sure that important 
information about incidents is shared with other 
employees who might benefit from it. 
0.80 
Q28 Employees are routinely informed about the progress 
and outcomes of incident investigations. 
0.78 
Q32 Information about incidents reaches all employees, 
even if they were away (off shift or on leave) when the 
incident information was disseminated. 
0.78 
Q27 At our work-site, we receive incident information that 
is relevant to our work. 
0.71 
Q29 Employees who do not regularly use computers at our 
work-site receive the same information about incidents 
as other employees. 
0.71 
Q33 At this work-site, we discuss incidents and what to do 
to prevent them with our colleagues outside safety 
meetings and safety-specific communications. 
0.68 
Q30 All employees eventually get to hear about incident 
information that other colleagues discussed informally. 
0.64 
Q26 At our work-site, we modify the way we learn from 
incidents depending on the nature of the incident. 
0.56 
Q34 We hear about incidents through informal discussions 
with our colleagues rather than through formal safety 
information systems. 
 0.38* 
Implementing Q51 We make a clear plan of action at the end of safety 0.81 
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actions meetings. 
Q53 We discuss whether safety recommendations from 
previous incidents are appropriate for our work before 
implementing them at our work-site. 
0.80 
Q54 Employees are informed about the outcomes of 
implementation of incident prevention 
recommendations/actions. 
0.79 
Q52 At our work-site, we learn from near misses and 
incidents. 
0.78 
Q56 Our company listens to employees’ ideas and 
suggestions for improving safety. 
0.74 
Q55 We follow the recommendations/actions in incident 
information without discussing them first. 
-0.19* 
The bi-factorial learning phase scales are outlined below. The results of the analysis for the 
Developing incident alerts and the contextualising scales are illustrated in Table 5. 
Table 5. Factor analysis of the Developing incident alerts and contextualising scale 
Scale  Items Factor 
loading 
1 2 
Developing 
Incident 
Alerts 
Scale 
Q13 When preparing incident information/lessons learned, we 
clearly point out why an incident has occurred. 
0.79   
Q16 When we disseminate incident information/lessons 
learned, we outline the attitudes and values that could 
help prevent another incident. 
0.75   
Q14 When developing incident information/lessons learned, 
we clearly point out which procedures need to be 
followed to avoid future incidents. 
0.73   
Q11 Clear recommendations and actions are suggested in the 
incident information/lessons learned we disseminate 
across the site after an incident. 
0.67   
Q15 When preparing incident information/lessons learned, we 
tell employees where to find more information about the 
incident. 
0.66   
Q10 We apply different learning approaches when learning 
form complex incidents compared with the approaches 
we use for simple incidents. 
  0.86 
Q9 When developing incident information/lessons learned, 
we adapt the content to suit different employees who will 
be receiving them. 
  0.84 
Q12 When preparing incident information/lessons learned, we 
decide whether the incident is relevant to the whole site 
or to specific work groups. 
  0.72 
Contextuali
sing 
scale 
Q45 We receive information about incidents that allows us to 
understand what really happened and how we can learn 
from it. 
0.75  
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Q44 We always receive responses to feedback we give on 
incident information. 
0.75  
Q49 There is a system in place for informal contribution of 
ideas and suggestions regarding safety and past incidents. 
0.75  
Q47 We know where to find relevant information regarding 
incidents so that we can prevent future similar incidents. 
0.73  
Q48 Incident information we receive suggests useful safety 
attitudes and values that can help us prevent future 
incidents. 
0.68  
Q38 At our work-site, we receive all the relevant incident 
information discussed at safety meetings. 
0.67  
Q43 We inform the safety department about good ideas related 
to safety that arise from our informal discussions. 
0.62  
Q40 At our work-site, we often give feedback to the authors of 
incident information. 
0.62  
Q39 The employees at this site can offer their 
recommendations for preventing future incidents. 
0.61  
Q41 We can comment on incident information we receive if 
we disagree with it. 
0.60  
Q50 At this work-site, we consider if we need to change the 
way we conduct work based on the incident information 
we receive. 
0.58  
Q46* The incident information we receive helps us understand 
which procedures we need to follow in order to prevent 
future incidents. 
0.47* 0.17* 
Q37 We continually question incident information we receive.  0.71 
Q36 We actively discuss incident information with our 
colleagues. 
 0.69 
Q35 We consider if the incident information we receive is 
relevant to our own work. 
 0.66 
Q42 We recognise when a piece of information about safety 
from our private discussions is important for the rest of 
the organisation. 
 0.52 
 
Results for the Developing incident alerts scale demonstrate that all variables load significantly onto 
the two sub-factors and provide good validity of the construct. All but one item had factor loadings 
above the standard; Q46 had loading just under the required 0.5 and was noted for further analysis.  
Learning Component Scales 
A second factor analysis was carried out using the learning component scales. Results indicate that 
four scales were mono-factorial (Type of problem, Learning participants, Type of knowledge and 
Formality of learning) and one was bi-factorial (Learning process). Table 6 illustrates the factor 
loadings for the mono-factorial learning component.  
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Table 6. Factor analysis for the mono-factorial learning component scales 
Scale Items Factor 
loading 
Type of 
problem 
Q51 We make a clear plan of action at the end of safety meetings. 0.76 
Q53 We discuss whether safety recommendations from previous 
incidents are appropriate for our work before implementing 
them at our work-site. 
0.74 
Q25 Incident investigations are conducted by a professional team 
who understand the nature of incidents. 
0.66 
Q26 At our work-site, we modify the way we learn from incidents 
depending on the nature of the incident. 
0.65 
Q36 We actively discuss incident information with our colleagues. 0.63 
Q35 We consider if the incident information we receive is relevant 
to our own work. 
0.52 
Q55 We follow the recommendations/actions in incident information 
without discussing them first. 
-0.21* 
Participants 
of learning 
Q28 Employees are routinely informed about the progress and 
outcomes of incident investigations. 
0.75 
Q44 We always receive responses to feedback we give on incident 
information. 
0.73 
Q39 The employees at this site can offer their recommendations for 
preventing future incidents. 
0.71 
Q38 At our work-site, we receive all the relevant incident 
information discussed at safety meetings. 
0.71 
Q32 Information about incidents reaches all employees, even if they 
were away (off shift or on leave) when the incident information 
was disseminated. 
0.71 
Q56 Our company listens to employees’ ideas and suggestions for 
improving safety. 
0.70 
Q29 Employees who do not regularly use computers at our work-site 
receive the same information about incidents as other 
employees. 
0.70 
Q40 At our work-site, we often give feedback to the authors of 
incident information. 
0.70 
Q41 We can comment on incident information we receive if we 
disagree with it. 
0.67 
Type of 
knowledge 
Q48 Incident information we receive suggests useful safety attitudes 
and values that can help us prevent future incidents. 
0.82 
Q45 We receive information about incidents that allows us to 
understand what really happened and how we can learn from it. 
0.82 
Q47 We know where to find relevant information regarding 
incidents so that we can prevent future similar incidents. 
0.78 
Q46 The incident information we receive helps us understand which 
procedures we need to follow in order to prevent future 
incidents. 
0.64 
Formality of Q31 Employees at this site make sure that important information 0.79 
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learning about incidents is shared with other employees who might 
benefit from it. 
Q33 At this work-site, we discuss incidents and what to do to 
prevent them with our colleagues outside safety meetings and 
safety-specific communications. 
0.76 
Q32 Information about incidents reaches all employees, even if they 
were away (off shift or on leave) when the incident information 
was disseminated. 
0.75 
Q43 We inform the safety department about good ideas related to 
safety that arise from our informal discussions. 
0.68 
Q42 We recognise when a piece of information about safety from 
our private discussions is important for the rest of the 
organisation. 
0.67 
Q34 We hear about incidents through informal discussions with our 
colleagues rather than through formal safety information 
systems. 
0.40* 
The results of the mono-factorial scales indicate that two questionnaire items do not load well onto 
the designed factors: Q55 and Q34. These items were marked for further analysis. Table 7 illustrates 
the factor analysis results for the Learning process scale. 
Table 7. Factor analysis of the Learning process scale 
Items Factor 
loading 
1 2 
Q23 Incident investigations are conducted in such a way that allows 
employees to be honest. 
0.76  
RQ21 Incidents at our site do not get reported due to fear of negative 
consequences. 
0.74  
Q24 We identify all the root causes of an incident before implementing 
further improvements. 
0.66  
Q20 The management at our site consistently encourages reporting of 
incidents. 
0.53  
Q37 We continually question incident information we receive. 
 
 0.75 
Q54 Employees are informed about the outcomes of implementation of 
incident prevention recommendations/actions. 
 0.69 
Q50 At this work-site, we consider if we need to change the way we conduct 
work based on the incident information we receive. 
 0.61 
Q52 
 
At our work-site, we learn from near misses and incidents.  0.60 
All items loaded above the minimum set in the procedure (0.5) indicating that all items can be 
retained for the Learning process scale. 
 
This paper was accepted for publication in Safety Science on 10 February 2017 
This post-print (final draft post-refereeing) is released under ‘Creative Commons Attribution, Non-Commercial, 
No Derivatives License’ 
 
18 
 
Internal consistency 
The reliability of the instrument was tested using Cronbach’s alpha. Cronbach’s alpha was calculated 
for each learning component scale as well as for each learning phase scale. We further analysed all 
items which did not meet an acceptable level of internal consistency (i.e. α < .70). There was good 
overall reliability of the LFIQ scales (Part 2): Site 1: α=0.95; and Site 2: α=0.94.   
Table 8 illustrates reliability results for the learning phase scales at both sites, while table 9 indicates 
the Cronbach’s alpha values for the learning component scales. Scales that did not meet the 
minimum criteria detailed in the analysis section are marked with an asterix (*). 
Table 8. Reliability of the learning phase scales at both sites 
Learning phase 
scale 
Number 
of items 
Site 1    Site 2 
n %   α n % α 
Reporting 6 705 95.3 0.73 39 95.1 0.70 
Investigating 3 720 97.3 0.80 40 97.6 0.72 
Developing 
incident alerts 8 145 19.6 0.80 16 39 0.55* 
Disseminating 9 708 95.7 0.85 40 97.6 0.71 
Contextualising 16 689 93.1 0.90 40 97.6 0.91 
Implementing 
actions 6 709 95.8 0.73 40 97.6 0.77 
The Cronbach’s alpha scores were acceptable (above 0.7) for all scales, except for the ‘Developing 
incident alerts’ scale at Site 2. However, this scale represents a branch of the questionnaire that was 
answered only by participants who actively develop alerts on the sites. This means that the number 
of respondents for the scale at Site 2 was small (n=16), so it was not possible to draw conclusions 
about the reliability of the scale at Site 2. Overall, the remaining learning phases’ reliability results 
show good reliability at both Sites. 
Table 9. Reliability of the learning component scales 
Learning phase scale Number 
of items 
Site 1    Site 2 
n %   α n % α 
Type of problem 7 702 94.9 0.71 40 97.6 0.71 
Learning process 10 687 92.8 0.83 39 95.1 0.79 
Participants of learning 11 686 92.7 0.88 39 95.1 0.84 
Type of knowledge 4 708 95.7 0.73 40 97.6 0.83 
Formality of learning 8 688 93.0 0.74 39 95.1 0.65* 
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Reliability tests across the learning component scales illustrated that all five learning component 
scales were reliable at Site 1. At Site 2 one of the five learning component scales (Formality of 
learning) did not result in the required level of reliability. By removing one item (Q34) the Formality 
of learning scale was tested within a satisfactory level of reliability (α=0.72). Although this 
reliability result was only shown for 39 responses at Site 2, Q34 was marked for further investigation 
in the factor analysis.  
Inter-item correlations, and correlations between LFI components at both sites demonstrated 
significant relationships.  While this was the case within each site, this did not translate to 
correlations across the two sites.  This may mean that LFIQ items tap into the same underlying 
concept within each site, and therefore may be considered too narrow. This would be supported by 
the finding that LFI was largely mono-factorial.   
 
4.3 Revisions to the LFIQ instrument 
The reliability studies and the principal component analyses indicated that the instrument is reliable 
and valid; though four items (Q19, Q34, Q46 and Q55) required modification. Arguably, the 
decisions on problematic questions should also include feedback from the potential end users of the 
questionnaire.  We therefore combined the suggestions from the focus groups with the results of the 
quantitative analyses in order to triangulate the data. In summary, we considered four criteria during 
the revision process:  
1. The results of the reliability study  
2. The results of the factor analysis   
3. The feedback received from the focus group at Site 1  
4. The feedback received from the focus group at site 2  
Only when at least 2 of the 4 criteria are not satisfied was an item modified or removed. The 
integrated analysis resulted in three groups of items.  
The first group comprised items which gave satisfactory results in reliability and factor analysis 
studies. Participants from both focus groups stated that these questions were clear. Table 10 offers an 
example of these questions. These items were retained in their original form. Unshaded cells indicate 
that a criterion was satisfied and white cells indicate that the criterion was satisfied. 
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Table 10 Items that satisfied all criteria 
Item Factor 
analysis 
Site 1 Focus group Site 2 Focus group 
Q32. Information 
about incidents 
reaches all 
employees, even 
if they were away 
(off shift or on 
leave) when the 
incident 
information was 
disseminated. 
Factor 
loading 
satisfactory 
 
Participants thought 
that the question was 
clear and that the 
results accurately 
represent the site.  
Participants thought 
that the question was 
clear. A couple of 
participants were 
surprised that there 
were any negative 
responses to this 
question. 
Q20. The 
management at 
our site 
consistently 
encourages 
reporting of 
incidents. 
Factor 
loading 
satisfactory 
 
Participants thought 
that the question was 
clear and that the 
results accurately 
represent the site. 
Participants thought 
that the question was 
clear and that the results 
accurately represent the 
site. 
 
The second group of items indicated problems in only one out of the four criteria. These items were 
also retained in the same format since problems in only one source do not justify modifying an 
otherwise valid item. Table 11 shows examples of items from the second group. 
Table 11. Items that did not satisfy one criterion 
Item Site 1 Focus group Site 2 Focus group 
Q35. We consider 
if the incident 
information we 
receive is 
relevant to our 
own work. 
Participants thought 
that the question was 
clear and that the 
results accurately 
represent the site. 
A participant suggested using ‘whether’ 
instead of ‘if’ to clarify the question. 
Another participant thought that 
‘Consideration is given…’ would be a 
better structure. 
Q46. The incident 
information we 
receive helps us 
understand which 
procedures we 
need to follow in 
order to prevent 
Participants thought 
that the question was 
clear and that the 
results accurately 
represent the site. 
Participants thought that the question 
was clear and that the results accurately 
represent the site. 
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The third group of items were the ones where at least two of the criteria were not satisfied and the 
question needed further modifying or removing. Table 12 indicates examples of these items.
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Table 12 Items that did not meet two or more criteria 
Item Reliability Factor 
analysis 
Site 1 Focus group Site 2 Focus group Decision 
Q55. We follow the 
recommendations/actions 
in incident information 
without discussing them 
first.  
α satisfactory 
 
 
Factor 
loading low: 
-0.193  
 
Participants thought the 
question was clear. Participants 
agreed with the results, noting 
that they did not discuss 
actions because they are 
discussed at a higher level.    
The question was not interpreted 
as discussing how the action 
affects their work but was 
understood as discussing incident 
information with all relevant 
groups in the company. 
Question updated to: 
 
We discuss actions aimed 
at improving learning 
from incidents before we 
implement them.  
Q34. We hear about 
incidents through 
informal discussions with 
our colleagues rather 
than through formal 
safety information 
systems 
Reduced α at 
Site 2 for the 
Formality of 
learning scale 
 
 
Factor 
loading low: 
0.380  
 
The participants thought the 
question was clear. 
The participants thought that there 
may be some misunderstanding 
whether they would be hearing 
about the incident for the first 
time as opposed to hearing about 
incident in general.  
Question updated to: 
Incident information 
reaches people at the site 
through formal processes 
rather than informally by 
word of mouth. 
Q19. At our workplace 
incidents are sometimes 
reported informally to 
colleagues without a 
formal record of the 
report.   
α satisfactory 
 
 
 
Factor 
loading low: 
0.373 
Participants pointed out that it 
is not clear whether colleagues 
are supervisors or co-workers. 
They implied that reporting to 
supervisors is already formal to 
an extent. All participants 
agreed that incidents and near 
misses have to be formally 
recorded in addition to 
reporting through the word 
mouth. 
Although some participants 
though the question is clear, two 
participants thought the question 
is not clear and they were not sure 
whether to strongly agree or 
disagree. Participants agreed that 
reporting all questions formally is 
important and that the focus of the 
question could be rectified to 
address that.   
Question updated to: 
Incidents always get 
reported in the formal 
systems rather than 
informally to other 
workers.  
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5. Conclusions and future research 
This paper outlined the development of an instrument to measure the quality of LFI processes and 
practices across an organisation or site. The Learning from Incidents Questionnaire (LFIQ) tested as 
valid and reliable for the reported sample. Items that tested as unreliable were redrafted or removed. 
Global analysis revealed one prominent factor that could measure the global quality of LFI at each 
site.  The LFIQ components have equal importance and appear to tap into one underlying construct, 
which comprises knowledge processing and learning from incidents within organisations. Thus the 
LFIQ instrument questions represent a range of important components that comprise one single 
concept.  The questions assigned to specific components appear to be of a similar nature, since the 
different items perform similarly within each component (Table 4).    
To measure the quality of LFI across an industrial site it is useful to have a single instrument that 
measures the learning components and learning phases of LFI. Combining the learning component 
and learning phase perspectives of LFI into a single instrument can yield results with high reliability 
and validity. Viewing LFI from both the sequential perspective of learning phases and quality 
perspective of learning components is important in ensuring learning from incident initiatives are as 
effective as possible. The study also indicates that combining quantitative and qualitative data 
provides a basis for the development of an instrument that is valid in relation to the context it is used 
in.  By gaining insight into employees’ perspectives on LFI, companies can diagnose areas of LFI 
that need to be improved. Therefore, the LFIQ can be used in industry to identify the potential for 
improvement of LFI processes and practices, as well as further researching the relationships between 
elements of LFI and objective safety outcomes. While conceptually sound, there are some limitations 
to the methodology and analysis in this study.  For example, though we recruited two sites to explore 
the validity of the LFIQ, most analysis, in particular the factor analysis were limited to the larger site 
1.  While we were able to control for possible organisational culture influences by avoiding to merge 
the data, there is a definite need to interrogate the factor structure of the LFIQ across different 
settings and contexts. This is particular important given the finding that LFIQ items tended to 
correlate with one another, suggesting that they all tap into one unifying concept, i.e. that of learning 
per se. While this is supported by the mono-factorial structure of the tool, the inter-item correlations 
may also flag up that the items are too narrow.  Arguably, we did conduct expert interviews with 
practitioners to verify the nature and importance of LFIQ items included, however, the sample was 
small and cannot be regarded as representative nor generalizable. Further, future research should 
establish convergent validity by correlating the LFIQ with a questionnaire addressing a similar 
construct, if it is possible to identify an appropriate tool, such as the Organisational Climate for 
Learning from Errors at Work (OLE) questionnaire (Putz et al., 2013). The questionnaire could also 
be potentially limited by differences between espoused theories and theories-in-use. As noted by 
Argyis and Schön (1996), there is often a difference between official policies and what happens in 
reality. The questionnaire was designed with this in mind, and aims to measure the reality of a 
workplace; further studies focusing on consistency between the results of the questionnaire and other 
data sources could help to ensure that results do not just reflect hypothetical policies. Future research 
is needed to establish predictive validity and implementation fidelity to reduce incidents and 
accidents in hazardous workplaces. 
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Appendix A. Operationalisation of the LFIQ concepts 
Learning 
component 
of LFI 
Dimensions Latent question Relevant learning phase of LFI 
Type of 
problem 
Considering complexity 
Different learning approaches need to be considered depending on the 
complexity of an incident (Deloitte, 2009; Snowden, 2002). 
Is the same learning approach 
implemented for all types of 
incidents, regardless of their 
complexity? 
Developing incident alerts 
Disseminating 
Importance of context 
Some incidents are more complex than others.  The solutions that prevent 
incidents in one context might not be relevant for another context. 
Solutions to prevent incidents should therefore be examined critically by 
employees when they receive incident information (Deloitte, 2009; 
Snowden, 2002). 
Is the local context of the 
workers considered when 
discussing learning points that 
arose from incidents in other 
settings/work contexts? 
Developing incident alerts 
Contextualising 
 
Implementing actions 
Collaborative sensemaking 
Sensemaking is a social process based on interactive communication. 
Therefore ‘meaning’ should be explicitly discussed so that employees have 
an equivalent (not necessarily the same) understanding of what happened 
and what needs to be done to prevent similar incidents from happening 
(Weick et al., 2005). 
Are sensemaking activities 
conducted collaboratively 
through voicing individual 
understandings?  
Investigating 
 
Contextualising 
 
Action oriented 
Sensemaking is action-oriented. Therefore, the discussions and 
collaborative interpretations in organisations should lead to concrete 
actions to improve safety (Weick et al., 2005). 
Are clear corrective actions 
developed in order to put 
learning from incidents into 
practice? 
Developing incident alerts 
Implementing actions 
 
Learning 
participants 
Deciding on relevance 
When developing and disseminating incident information, it is essential to 
consider who can benefit from incident alerts arising from that specific 
incident.  Some incidents require dissemination of incident alerts to the 
whole site, some to only local groups and some to the wider industrial 
sector (Le Coze, 2008). 
Is the relevance of incident 
information actively considered 
in the LFI process?  
Developing incident alerts 
Disseminating 
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Communication 
All workers that can benefit from LFI information should receive that 
information in a timely manner (Cooke & Rohleder, 2006). 
Do employees receive timely 
incident information through 
various LFI activities? 
Disseminating 
Contextualising 
Pathways for participation 
Employees should be treated as active learning agents rather than recipients 
of information. Therefore, employees should be encouraged to actively 
contribute to LFI (Billet & Pavlova, 2005; Fuller & Unwin, 2004). 
Is the LFI process allowing 
employees to contribute their 
ideas and offer feedback on 
incident information? 
Reporting 
Contextualising 
Learning 
participants 
Giving input 
In addition to the company allowing and encouraging employees to give 
their input into LFI, employees should take that opportunity and offer their 
suggestions and feedback (Billet & Pavlova 2005; Loud, 2004) 
Do employees actively offer 
input to incident information? Contextualising 
Organisational response 
When employees understand the impact of their contribution to the LFI 
process, their motivation to engage with safety and LFI is significantly 
improved (Fuller & Unwin, 2004). 
Does the company respond to 
employees who have given 
feedback? 
Contextualising 
Implementing actions 
Learning 
process 
Climate of openness 
Double-loop learning requires a climate of trust in which employees can 
discuss incidents freely within an organisation (Kululanga, G.K, Price, 
A.D.F., & Macaffer, R., 2002; Rose, 2004). 
Can incidents be discussed 
freely without fear of the ‘blame 
culture’? 
Reporting 
Investigating 
Commitment to learning 
The organisational commitment to LFIis an important element of double-
loop learning. The organisations exibit their commitment to LFI through 
consistency between the declared learning goals and actual practice 
(Argyris & Schön, 1996; Kululanga et al., 2002). 
Is the company showing 
commitment to learning from 
incidents?  
Reporting 
 
Implementing actions 
Changing the governing values 
 In order to achieve double loop learning, the organisation needs to aim at 
seeking and adopting improved management and working approaches 
through evaluation of current practice (Jashapara, 2003; Wong et al., 2012). 
Are employees questioning the 
way they conduct work when 
considering previous incidents? Contextualising 
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Identifying the root of the problem  
The root causes that lead to an incident should be identified before deciding 
the actions that will be taken to improve the incident (Kletz. 2001; 
Kululanga et al., 2002; Wong et al., 2012) 
Are investigations conducted 
fully before future 
recommendations are 
implemented? 
Investigating 
Type of 
knowledge 
Conceptual knowledge 
Conceptual knowledge is important because it helps individuals understand 
the possible nature of an incident, and its relationship with other, associated 
work situations (Kramer & Cole, 2003). 
Is the conceptual knowledge 
overtly considered in the LFI 
process? 
Developing incident alerts 
Contextualising 
Procedural knowledge 
Understanding what procedures need to be followed or changed to prevent 
future incidents is a relevant aspect of LFI (Kramer & Cole, 2003). 
Is the procedural knowledge 
overtly considered in the LFI 
process? 
Developing incident alerts 
Contextualising 
Locative knowledge 
Employees should know where to find the knowledge they need to deal 
with safety incidents in the most effective manner (IBM Institute for 
Business Value studies, 2009; Nichols-Nixon, 1997). 
Is the locative knowledge overtly 
considered in the LFI process? 
Developing incident alerts 
 
Contextualising 
Dispositional knowledge  
The dispositions and safety values underpin the development of other types 
of knowledge. LFI should challenge employee’s existing dispositions that 
may increase the risk of an incident. (Cooke & Rohleder, 2006). 
Is the dispositional knowledge 
overtly considered in the LFI 
process? 
Developing incident alerts 
Contextualising 
Formality 
of learning 
Existence of informal communications 
A great deal of discussions around incidents happen outside formal 
company systems through everyday work and private discussions. These 
activities provide an opportunity for informal learning from incidents 
(Deloitte, 2009; Eraut, 2004; Melo & Beck, 2011; Sanne, 2008). 
To what extent are opportunities 
for informal learning from 
incidents present at the site? 
Reporting 
Disseminating 
Contextualising 
Recognising learning potential of informal communications 
In order for relevant information from informal discussions to enter the 
formal structures the community needs to recognise learning potential of 
information and ideas and capture them for the rest of the organisation 
(Eraut, 2004; Melo & Beck, 2011; Tynjälä, 2008). 
Do employees recognize and 
capture relevant information 
from informal discussions 
related to incidents? 
Disseminating 
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Integrating informal learning 
Important ideas and information related to incidents are often overlooked 
by formal processes. It is important that possible suggestions, ideas and 
inputs from informal discussions enter the formal LFI system so that the 
rest of the company could benefit from them (Deloitte, 2009; Sanne, 2008; 
Slotte et al., 2004; Svensson et al., 2004; Tynjälä, 2008). 
To what extent do important 
information and ideas arising 
from informal discussions of 
incidents enter the formal LFI 
system?  
Contextualising 
Disseminating 
 
 
 
